As a sample of the writing that I have done as a student of Political Science, I present two original papers from my undergraduate career at the University of Pittsburgh.

The first is about the causes of the Syrian Civil War, from an International Relations course that I took in the fall of my junior year called Civil Wars. 

The second is a piece about the reconciliation of Deliberation and Leadership in a deliberative environment, from the Democratic Theory course that I took in the fall of my senior year.

Please excuse any formatting errors due to Portfolio limitations.

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The Syrian Civil War – more than just a political revolution?

The Arab Spring was a multi-national revolt against tyrannical and oppressive regimes across the Middle East. Among many countries affected, Syria continues to be one of the most contested, with vast levels of death, refugees and war costs. The onset of the Syrian civil war can be explained by a variety of factors. First, grievances and opportunitymobilized the population to rebel against their oppressors in the Assad regime. They hail from a variety of devices, including political and economic inequality, weak and corrupt regime characteristics (combined with transnational actors), and indiscriminate violence stemming from informational asymmetries. Second, commitment problems forced the involved actors (Assad regime and future rebels) to resort directly to war, bypassing any attempts to negotiate or bargain. The combination of these factors created a disastrous situation of political instability and humanitarian collapse.

Before divulging into the various mechanisms that lead to the Syrian civil conflict, one must consider the current state of the rebellion. Estimates put deaths at around a quarter of a million, and 11 million displaced from their homes since the conflict began in 2011, 4.5 million of which have taken refuge in other countries (BBC 2016). Direct actors include the Syrian government, a Shia Alawite regime led by President Bashar al-Assad, various rebel groups (some Islamist and some secular), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and a variety of proxy actors (United States, Iran/Hezbollah, Russia). Protests against government torture, specifically regarding a group of students who painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall, led to widespread protests in March 2011 – protests that were vehemently swatted down by state forces (BBC 2016). Opposition groups organized and armed themselves to fight their government over the brutal crackdown, and the country spiraled into civil war (BBC 2016). This is Syria today – a mess of competing powers, religious sects and foreign interests. It is now time to rewind, and understand why this conflict began.

The first contributor to the onset of civil war in Syria is grievances and opportunity, a system where rebel groups feel contemptuous towards and alienated by their government, leading to calls for change when an opportunity to rebel presents itself (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Syria’s civil war can be attributed to these ideas through various mechanisms. First, severe economic inequality and repression created a disgruntled population of Syrian citizens. Secondly, religiously motivated political exclusion by the Shia Assad regime marginalized the country’s Sunni majority, further alienating the people from support of their government. Thirdly, weak regime type and political corruption plagued the Syrian government, reducing accountability and giving a window of opportunity to fight back when combined with transnational emulation. Finally, indiscriminate violence against protestorsbecame the final nail in the coffin.

The prewar Syrian economy is the first main grievance that motivated rebellion. Cederman et al (2011) found that economic inequality increases the risk of civil war as GPD per capita moves away from the average. Prewar Syria was home to a grossly divided economy, with a large part run by elites in the Assad regime (Heritage 2016). State interference was damaging the labor market, especially when combined with intense drought in the region, causing stagnation and inflation (2016). This “repressive economic environment has marginalized the private sector and prevented sustainable development, [causing] seriously undermined monetary freedom” (2016). As such, the mechanisms elaborated by Cederman et al were put into motion, creating economically attributed grievances via lack of fiscal freedom and impeded expansion of the private sector. The rebels thus have an economic angle to seek change in the regime. However, these are not the only government created grievances that boosted resolve of the to-be rebels.

Religiously motivated political exclusion is the second grievance by which the rebels organized in 2011. Again, Cederman et all (2011) found that political exclusion also has a strong positive effect on the onset of civil war. As with economic grievances, this mechanism applies directly in the Syrian civil conflict’s onset, although with a religious twist. The Syrian government is a Shia Alawite regime, openly representing and pushing the agenda of this particular sect of Islam. Quite to the contrary, the Syrian population is a Sunni Muslim majority. As one can find commonly throughout the Middle East, this religious sectarianism is the basis for political conflict. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs discusses religious factors of the Syrian civil war and, specifically, how the Assad regime (and the regime he replaced) excluded the country’s Sunni majority from privilege in government, in favor of Syria’s Shia minority (Sedaca 2013). Subsequently, Cederman et al’s findings take the reins, and the Sunni majority’s political marginalization created anger and distrust of the Syrian government, contributing to violent civil conflict. The government’s religious marginalization of the population is not the only mechanism through which it causes problems, however.

Weak government institutions are the next piece behind the grievances and opportunity framework. Heger et al (2001) found that, on a scale ranging from autocracy to democracy, the risk of civil war has an upside-down bell curve. Specifically, strong democracies and strong autocracies have the lowest chance of regime type induced civil war, and anocracies/ transitional/mixed regimes have the highest. Syria’s government has a combination of autocratic institutions and democratic institutions (Maddex, 2014, p. 275), making it the most vulnerable regime type. The government has a very strong executive branch, where the president is able to take complete legislative control when Parliament, elected via universal suffrage, is not in session (275). A very powerful executive branch is a telltale signifier of autocratic institutions, where top-down authority makes the decisions. However, the presence of a legislature elected by the people designates the Syrian government a mixed regime (or anocracy); as such, it is more susceptible to civil war, as per Hegre et al’s findings. Anocracy creates a dangerous situation of high grievances, due to the autocratic institutions in place, and strong opportunity (or sentiments) to advocate change, due to the legislature (a democratic institution). On top of these unfavorable characteristics, the Assad regime is phenomenally corrupt, ranking just 18/100 on the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International (“Corruption Perceptions Index 2015”, 2016). Syria created both the channels and the grievances to push for revolt, combined with a government that has zero accountability or reliable institutions.

To further extrapolate the weakness of mixed regimes, consider researchers Maves and Braithwaite (2013). They assess the civil war potential of a mixed autocracy (as found in Syria) specifically in a conflict ridden regional context, aiming to see whether the context makes this regime type more susceptible to civil war. Their study concluded that mixed regimes, specifically autocratic regimes with an elected legislature (again, as found in Syria), are more likely to experience civil conflict if the region they are situated in is heavy with war. Syria – an autocratic style regime with an elected legislature in an incredibly unstable region (think Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab Spring, etc) – is experiencing civil conflict. The combination style government is creating grievances, via the methods discussed, but also showing willingness to give concessions and avenues to press for change (the legislature). It is thus pushing both grievances AND opportunity, and when combined with a neighborhood defined by conflict, adds as a source of inspiration and emulation for rebels to desire revolution against the government via transnational actors. Syria demonstrates precisely why mixed regimes can be dangerous, and their excessive use of coercion is the physical embodiment of this weakness.

The next source of grievances is likely the most direct cause for the rebellion – the indiscriminate use of force, as a consequence of informational asymmetry. Walter (2009) details the basics of this mechanism quite nicely. Her studies found that it is extremely hard for governments (who will likely want to appear tough) to know rebel strength, capabilities, foreign donors or financial support, especially if the terrain is large and difficult to traverse (Syria’s population is concentrated towards the West, leaving much of it sparsely populated, hard to cross and difficult to control (South & Jermyn, 2005, p. 53)). Given the current power struggle in Syria, it is quite clear that the government underestimated the potential power of the to-be rebels within their people – while simultaneously bluffing about their own military capabilities. This bluffing, culminating in the shooting and killing of vast numbers of peaceful protesters in 2011 (the indiscriminate use of force), was a move to appear tough in front of challengers whose resolve and capabilities seemed fairly insignificant. Their lack of information (stemming from poor intrusive societal organizations and tough terrain) about the protesters’ intentions, overestimation of their own coercive ability, and underestimation of the peoples’ resolve led to an overreaction, to put it lightly. Thus, grievances were pushed over the edge. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) found that indiscriminate violence is also a central mechanism for rebel recruitment. Their idea is that, if the state is willing to commit violence against civilians, then it is safer to participate in the rebellion and be within their protective sphere of resources, unity and defense mechanisms, then to be a bystander. The fast buildup of opposition forces in Syria, following the initial killings, is very indicative of this trend. Overall, Syrian actors’ refusal to negotiate before resorting to force transitions the discussion over to another contributor to the war, moving beyond grievances and opportunity.

Commitment problems are the final piece of the puzzle to Syria’s brutal civil war. It is center puzzle piece to the relationship between Assad’s informational asymmetries and his indiscriminate use of force. Walter (2006) elaborated on commitment problems as a cause of civil war and as an impedance to bargaining between actors, stating that actors may not trust each other to hold to a potential deal (if bargaining were to succeed), and are more likely to resort to civil war to settle the disagreement decisively. Consider, again, President Assad’s immediate response to peaceful protest with indiscriminate violence. His forces were unaware of who or what the challengers to the regime were, and responded by trying to eliminate those particular individuals by eliminating the entire group of protesters. Subsequently, the rebels resorted to force because they had little or no confidence in the possibility of Assad’s regime holding to a bargain, in the event that bargaining were to actually succeed, because he resorted to violence in the first place. Neither party trusted the other to honor a future agreement, and war was the next step in settling the score.

In summary, there is no simplistic explanation for the onset of war in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011. Some factors, such as grievances, were years in the making – a slow broil of economic, political and religious tensions. Conversely, some were spontaneous, like government coercion of protesters. Both of these factors hit a nerve within the Syrian people that they saw an opportunity to exploit, and subsequently, the civil war erupted. With a conclusion nowhere in sight, conflict in the region is a reality that will plague the modern world for years to come. My hope, both as a student in the field and future diplomat for the Department of State, is that the Syrian people will eventually find the freedom and stability they deserve.

 

Works Cited

Cederman, Lars Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristin Skrede Gleditsch. “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison.” American Political Science Review 105.3 (2011): 478-95. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 11 July 2011. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

“Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.” Transparency International. N.p., 2016. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75-90. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Peter Gleditsch. “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” American Political Science Review 95.1 (2001): 33-48. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Matthew Adam Kolcher. “HOW “FREE” IS FREE RIDING IN CIVIL WARS? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem.” World Politics59.2 (2007): 177-216. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 23 June 2015. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Maddex, Robert L. Constitutions of the World. Routledge: Routledge, 2014. Google Books. Google, 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Maves, Jessica, and Alex Braithwaite. “Autocratic Institutions and Civil Conflict Contagion.” Southern Political Science Association 75.2 (2013): 478-91. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 2 Apr. 2013. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Rogers, Lucy, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare. “Syria: The Story of the Conflict.” BBC News. 2016 BBC, 11 Mar. 2016. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Sedaca, Nicole Bibbins. “The Religious Component of the Syrian Conflict: More than       Perception.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2013): n. pag. Georgetown.edu. 21 June 2013. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

South, Coleman, and Leslie Jermyn. Syria. Vol. 10. N.p.: Marshal Cavendish, 2005. Cultures of the World. Google Books. Google, 1 Sept. 2005. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

“Syria.” 2016 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation, 2016. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Toft, Monica Duffy. “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War.” Security Studies (2006): 34-69. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 16 Aug. 2010. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

Walter, Barbara F. “Bargaining Failures and Civil War.” Annual Review of Political Science (2009): 243-63. Courseweb. University of Pittsburgh, 2009. Web. 13 Nov. 2016.

 

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Leadership and Deliberation – Irreconcilable Differences?

 

Part I: Theoretical Analysis

Part II: Case Study – The United States House of Representatives

 

(Edited 12/30/17)

 

Part I: Theoretical Analysis

 

In thinking about deliberation, rarely does one specifically consider the function (or lack thereof) of leadership in a deliberative environment. And yet, leadership and deliberation are often hailed as foundational cornerstones to liberal democracy. Their minimal, almost nonexistent reconciliation in the literature is the focus of this section. I argue that leadership is, in fact, fundamentally incompatible with deliberation in a deliberative democracy, and this is for several reasons. First, the equal dispersion of power in an egalitarian deliberation leaves no room for the hierarchy that is leadership to influence the discussion topics, structure or debate. Second, the very nature of leadership is paradoxical to the concept of inclusion, which Iris Marion Young argues to be a central tenement of deliberation. Third, since a leader is superior to deliberators in status and esteem, he or she may not be as incentivized to justify his or her position, and as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue, justification in deliberation is key to best understanding deliberators’ true preferences. Fourth, a leader in deliberation negatively impacts an original concept which, inspired by Eric Beerbohm’s writings on democratic leadership, I call the Choice Possibility Environment, because the leader limits the scope of possible preferences in deliberation by doing what a leader does – moving discussion away from certain positions and towards others. For these reasons, leadership and deliberation are fundamentally at odds. However, before elaborating on this argument, I will begin by laying some groundwork, explaining, 1.) what leadership is, and 2.) what deliberation is.

Leadership is quite a complex concept, and its function in democracy is extremely difficult to clearly define. James Pennock describes a leader, in general, as one who has influence over free individuals, who follow his or her leadership willingly attributed to “the influencing and guiding of the conduct of others in a situation” (Pennock, 473). Thus, a leader is a vehicle of persuasion, who convinces followers that his, hers or another’s preference is the ideal one for their collective purposes. Pennock also states that leadership (cooperation and persuasion of free-willed individuals) and domination (coercion of individuals to follow the leader’s preference) are intertwined concepts on a spectrum that leaders fall within (Pennock, 476). A leader, then, must strike a balance between convincing and coercing his or her followers, and depending on where the leader falls on the spectrum between these two extremes, Pennock would denote the leadership style cooperation or domination (Pennock, 477). Leadership, then, is quite fluid as a concept and as an institution, and can range from forced compliance with the leader’s preferences to persuasion of free-willed individuals. In both cases, however, the overarching goal of the leader is to maintain the strength of the followership and influence others to follow the leader’s preference. The undertone to this role is that it assumes some kind of hierarchical superiority between the followers and the leader; somehow, the leader is in a higher, more powerful or more esteemed position than the followers, hence the dichotomy of these two bodies. Thus, the leader uses his or her position of superiority as a platform to maintain the followership and strengthen this power relationship. Pennock talks further about a leader’s role in “aiding the thought of others,” facilitating compromise, changes to preferences and creating “an order of priorities” (Pennock, 485-486). The leader, then, plays a direct (but unique) role in the subject matter and style of deliberation, with significant blanket influence. Overall, then, we can generally conclude that leadership involves an individual with some amount of hierarchical superiority above his or her followers, who seeks to align them (using techniques that are listed above) with his or another’s preference in any given topic (either through persuasion or coercion), and uses the elevated platform that is being a leader to more strongly assert that preference or position above that which the followers believe (assuming that they are not the same, which they may or may not be). Now that leadership has been properly defined for discussion in the context of deliberation, we must turn to defining that concept.

Deliberation, in the context of democracy, is an egalitarian discussion body composed of citizens who are all present with the intent of discussing an issue and then coming to a consensus on what the best course of action or policy preference is. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson lay out the specifics beautifully, and deliberation in a democratic society needs to have several key characteristics. Within this egalitarian issue-discussing body, all deliberators must justify their preferences or policy positions, and these justifications should be accessible to all deliberators and share common assumptions (Gutmann and Thompson, 3-4). Thus, one cannot root their preference in some kind of deity, for example, as all deliberators may not be equally faithful and thus cannot properly consider the preference in debate. Justifications must be clear and share the same basic assumptions, to allow deliberators to have clarity and transparency when considering other preferences. This way, one can theoretically see another’s true motives for their preferences, and judge their merit accordingly. While they are less relevant to this paper, binding decisions and a dynamic dialogue are also central to deliberation, as they ensure that deliberators are debating to make an actually meaningful impact on policy (not just to argue) and that future revisions of deliberative decisions are always possible (Gutmann and Thompson, 5-6). Iris Marion Young specifies the details of the deliberators themselves and the environment, stating that, among many, inclusion (both internal and external) and political equality (opportunity to speak, criticize and question, inability to coerce or dominate) are key cornerstones of effective deliberation (Young, 23). Thus, Young’s definition of deliberation states that all who are affected by the deliberation’s decisions should be given equivalent and effective representation, and all present must be given equal opportunity and chance in the deliberation. Thus, we can generally define deliberation as an egalitarian discussion body, with political equality, clarity of preferences and justifications, effective inclusion internally and externally and legitimate policy influence as a decision-making body. With leadership and deliberation defined, we can now move onto the discussion of why these concepts are fundamentally at odds.

The first conflict between leadership and deliberation relates to deliberation’s dispersion of power. As a decision-making and representative body, deliberation, by definition, spreads authority out equally across all members of the group. This intentionally minimizes the concentration of power to most effectively weigh the influence of population subgroups into the discussion. The problem with leadership in deliberation, then, is fairly self-evident: How can power and influence within the discussion body be equally dispersed and structured around egalitarianism, if there is a leader present who, as Pennock describes, sits atop a group of “followers” as a superior? The very concept of a superior participant in deliberation is oxymoronic, because it is an environment of equality, fair play and equal opportunity. Such an environment has no space or allowance of a superior participant, and being that a leader sits atop his or her mass of followers amidst a dynamic but unequal relationship of persuasion and feedback, he or she can never fit into this egalitarian atmosphere. These institutions are fundamentally at odds with each other, and a deliberative body could not have a leader and remain a deliberation because it would violate crucial characteristics of deliberation, such as political equality. The equality and dispersion of power that defines deliberation is structurally incompatible with a leader who holds a superior role and whose existence is a divisive tool that categorizes individuals into a hierarchy of power. The crucial conflict is that a person of concentrated authority cannot coexist in an environment of equally dispersed authority. They are fundamentally at odds, and this structural incompatibility is the first cause of friction between the two institutions.

The second major point of friction between leadership and deliberation is rooted in Iris Marion Young’s discussion on inclusion. Internal inclusion is key to deliberation, as Young elaborates, claiming that internal exclusion is one of the key problems to be alleviated in deliberation. She describes it as a situation where “people may find that their claims are not taken seriously, and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect… these familiar experiences… concern the ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others” (Young, 55). Thus, Young is concerned with maintaining an environment in deliberation that avoids internal exclusion, where every deliberator’s input, contributions and claims are given the respect they are due and a fair opportunity for defense and criticism. She uses the word “equal,” and this, again, speaks to the egalitarian nature of the deliberative environment. It is here that friction with leadership occurs. Deliberation must respect the preferences and opinions of all deliberators equally, giving all an equivalent opportunity to speak, allowing no members to take precedence over others. All contributions are “worthy of consideration” (Young, 55). And yet, a leader’s role in deliberation would be inherently paradoxical to the concept of inclusion. As someone whose role is to be an arbiter and a facilitator of discussion and priorities, the leader aligns with none of these qualities. The leader is one whose contributions and preferences are given above average levels of respect and consideration. He or she is the leader, “aiding the thought of others… the standard bearer of a flag around which followers can gather, unite” (Pennock, 485). It is a position that each deliberator holds in higher esteem than that in which they likely hold each other; if a dispute were to erupt, the leader’s intervention would likely garner more respect than intervention from another deliberator, in the same way that a school teacher’s intervention in a school yard brawl would garner more respect among the pupils than the intervention of another student. Pennock states that the leader is someone who followers unite around, thereby granting him or her elevated status. If this were the case, then the other deliberators would be internally excluded, because they do not garner the same level of respect or esteem in their participation and contribution in the discussion as the leader. The leader’s word is taken more seriously than that of the deliberators, and this internally excludes them. Thus, if incorporating leadership into deliberation would result in internal exclusion, a symptom that Young argues is contradictory to effective deliberation, then it represents yet another reason that leadership and deliberation are incompatible. How can deliberation be successful if the introduction of a leader propagates internal exclusion?

The third reason leadership and deliberation are at odds builds on the superior platform of leadership, and involves the importance of justification of one’s preferences in deliberation. As I touched on previously, Gutmann and Thompson speak heavily on the importance of justification, and its enormous role in effective deliberation need not be stated repeatedly. However, when it is theoretically combined with the elevated position of respect and esteem that a leader has, friction ensues. A leader, being in such a position that his or her contributions and preferences, when expressed, are treated with more serious consideration and respect, has some justification in the validity of his or her preferences rooted in this position of higher respect and esteem. The leader is, in theory, more qualified, and this could be an unspoken justification in itself. A leader may not feel the need to justify his or her preferences as effectively as a deliberator, because the position as leader puts him or her at an inherent advantage when it comes to having the validity of the preference evaluated. Consider a child arguing with his mother; the mother can root her decision to not allow her child to eat dessert in, for example, “because I said so.” Justification for her decision about the dessert is implied through her position of superiority with relation to the child, and she does not have to give reasons. A leader in deliberation could infringe on justification, an incredibly important characteristic, by asserting preferences without explicit justification. His or her superior position could be used as reasoning for a preference instead of genuine evidence-based defense, which is required of all the deliberators. While this is a more theoretical possibility, the commonality of a parent justifying their decision “because they said so” goes to show that such an abuse by a leader in deliberation is possible. Thus, if the leader contributes and influences discussion with positions that are not explicitly justified, he or she is violating the requirement of explicit reasoning, and cannot coexist in a deliberative environment. This risk is yet another reason that leadership is incompatible with deliberation, as justification is a necessity, not an option, and the potential for its absence would undermine the deliberative atmosphere.

Finally, a leader’s existence within deliberation could compromise my original, but still central aspect of deliberation, called the Choice Possibility Environment. In essence, CPE is the range of all possible preferences to be considered in deliberation. Since deliberators should be appropriately randomized to avoid biased representation, the number of possible preferences discussed should be infinite. This is key – the deliberation must be conducive to discussion of all possible policies and preferences, as any single preference could be a successful answer to the problem being deliberated. All possibilities must have an equal opportunity to come to the table. However, the introduction of a leader in deliberation presents a problem that Beerbohm touches on, but fails to reconcile. He is concerned that the people are too malleable and could consider only policies asserted by the leader, stating that “the citizenry is akin to a pliable mold upon which leaders press policy positions” (Beerbohm, 649). The deliberators, being representatives of the citizenry, are indeed receptive, but potentially overly-susceptible to conforming to the preferences of the leader. Thus, if the leader’s preference or general direction of the discussion and thought in the deliberation consistently influences the participants and the flow of deliberation, then this is changing CPE. It is no longer pulling preferences out of the population, but pulling preferences out of the leader, and this does not give equal opportunity to positions from the deliberators, independently sourced, to come to the table. Thus, CPE is compromised, and preferences from the population (whom the deliberators represent) may not have sufficient opportunity for consideration. The deliberators’ range of discussion preferences could be limited by the leader’s contributions. This is the final reason that leadership and deliberation are incompatible; the all-encompassing and equal-opportunity nature of deliberation’s discussion points could be compromised, negatively affecting its success.

To summarize, deliberation and leadership, as I have defined, cannot be successfully implemented together. Due to power dispersion, internal inclusion, justifications, and the necessity of an effective Choice Possibility Environment, being essential characteristics of a proper deliberative body, it is my belief that these institutions cannot coexist with leadership except with the unacceptably imperfect function of each. Future deliberations should avoid the democratic fallacy that incessantly feels a leader is necessary in deliberation, because these two institutions cannot properly function as one entity.

 

Part II: Case Study – The United States House of Representatives

 

The U.S. House of Representatives provides an interesting case study, as it is a deliberative environment that incorporates leadership, primarily in the form of the Speaker of the House. As such, it allows some of the concepts touched on previously to be articulated further, highlighting their actual existence in the real world. The House’s combination of deliberation and leadership supports the fact that these institutions are inherently conflictual for two reasons. First, the dispersion of power in the Congress is disrupted due to the superior position of the Speaker of the House. Second, the Speaker of the House greatly infringes on inclusion and the Choice Possibility Environment, because he or she has the power to unilaterally direct the flow, topics and speakers in Congressional deliberation. The U.S. House of Representatives is therefore a testament to friction between the institutions of leadership and deliberation when combined.

First, dispersion of power is negatively impacted by the House’s structure because it is comprised of a leader (one of superior power, who sits atop his or her followers) among supposed equals. Recall that, in a deliberation, power is to be spread evenly amongst deliberators, so that each has an equivalent opportunity to contribute, vote, respond, argue and discuss. This egalitarian environment is crucial to true deliberation. However, introducing a leader, as discussed, compromises this egalitarianism, as the leader is quite literally a superior among equals. In the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House fulfills this role and thus destroys the egalitarian environment. He or she has “the institutional role of presiding officer and administrative head of the House [and] the partisan role of leader of the majority party in the House” (Republicans, 2016). Thus, the Speaker of the House’s role as leader puts him or her in a position of superiority, able to preside over the deliberation as an administrator. Nobody can be in a position of superiority in a deliberation without damaging its crucial egalitarian structure, so deliberation is compromised in the House from a basic structural level. Additionally, because the Speaker represents the majority party, he or she is in an even higher position of superiority compared to the minority party and its leadership. The majority party can essentially run Congress in complete accordance with its own agenda. The Speaker is then a superior among equals who are superiors in themselves to the minority party. This is not conducive to a properly egalitarian assembly. As a result, the House is not a true deliberative environment, and goes to show that a leader cannot effectively exist in that context without being an impediment to deliberation as an institution.

Second, the Speaker of the House’s position of leadership compromises inclusion and the Choice Possibility Environment (CPE) because he or she has the power to unilaterally influence agendas, topics and the flow of discussion. This compromises inclusion because the Speaker’s word carries more weight and influence than deliberators, and compromises CPE because every preference no longer has the same opportunity for consideration.

Inclusion is the idea that every deliberator’s word is accepted, respected, and given equal opportunity and consideration in the discussion. It is at odds with a leader, from a theoretical standpoint, because a leader’s structural position of superior power and authority means that his or her word will likely be given more respect and consideration than that of the average deliberator. In the House, the Speaker is much the same, as his or her superior position internally excludes the other deliberators whose word is not given the same deference. The Speaker “makes many important rulings and decisions in the House” (Republicans, 2016), implying that he or she has the power to singularly make more impactful decisions than the other deliberators. If the Speaker is in this heightened position and can make higher-level decisions, then his or her word will almost certainly be given greater respect and esteem than the rest of the assembly. This internally excludes the rest of the Congressmen and Congresswomen, whose word is not received as seriously. For this reason, the Speaker of the House’s leadership could negatively impact internal inclusion in the House.

Finally, recall that the Choice Possibility Environment is the sum of every possible preference that can be discussed in a deliberation. Ideally, CPE must never be affected, as any possible preference or policy option could be a solution to the problem that is driving the deliberation. Thus, they must all have equal opportunity to be brought to the table by deliberators. This concept does not allow for any individual to single-handedly impede certain preferences from discussion while promoting others, because every position must have the theoretical chance to be debated. Therein lies the problem: In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House is given powers that specifically inhibit CPE, and this creates conflict between leadership and the deliberation. The Speaker “appoints special or select committees… has the power of recognition of Members to speak, [and] determine[s] the legislative agenda for the House” (Republicans, 2016). The Speaker of the House’s role is to direct discussion away from certain preferences and towards others, in addition to having the discretion of arbitrarily permitting certain members to speak. This is in complete contradiction to CPE, as the Speaker unilaterally narrows down the range of possible preferences and positions that can be brought into deliberation. The environment of discussion points is now infringed upon. Since CPE cannot properly function in this environment as a result of leadership, it goes to show yet another way that deliberation and leadership could be at odds in the Congress.

The U.S. House of Representatives exemplifies the conflict that could emerge when inserting leadership into a deliberative context. The Speaker of the House’s role negatively impacts dispersion of power, inclusion and the Choice Possibility Environment, concepts that I argue are integral to the efficient and proper function of a deliberation.

 

Works Cited

 

Beerbohm, Eric. “Is Democratic Leadership Possible?” American Political Science Review, vol. 109, no. 4, 2015, pp. 639–652., doi:10.1017/S0003055415000398.

Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. “What Deliberative Democracy Means.” Why Deliberative Democracy, Princeton University Press, pp. 1–195, courseweb.pitt.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-23818060-dt-content-rid-            21678367_2/courses/2181_UPITT_PS_1619_SEC1050/Gutmann%20and%20Thompson %202004%20-%20Why%20Deliberative%20Democracy%20-%20Chapter%201.pdf.

Pennock, James Roland. “Leadership.” Democratic Political Theory, 1979, pp. 470–505,   courseweb.pitt.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-23820171-dt-content-rid-                 21680692_2/courses/2181_UPITT_PS_1619_SEC1050/Pennock%201979%20-%20Leadership.pdf.

Republicans, House. “Speaker of the House.” Gop.gov, House Republicans, 2016, www.gop.gov/leadership/speaker-of-the-house/.

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